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THE UPBRINGING OF A CREATURE: THE SCOPE OF A PARENT’S 
RIGHT TO TEACH CHILDREN TO HATE 
By  
Brooke A. Emery* 
There is no absurdity so ob-
vious that it cannot be firmly 
planted in the human head if 
you only begin to impose it 
before the age of five, by 
constantly repeating it with 
an air of great solemnity.1 
 
INTRODUCTION: THE BIRTH OF A CREATURE 
 
 This paper examines racist2 speech that is passed down 
from parent to child and asks whether the State can constitution-
ally impose regulations3 on such speech.4  The regulation of par-
ent-to-child racist speech implicates 
two distinct constitutional rights: 
one’s right to free speech and a par-
ent’s right to control the upbringing 
of her child.   
 The United States Consti-
tution contemplates that its citizens 
be free to “think as [they] will and 
speak as [they] think.”5  The First 
Amendment protects this freedom 
by prohibiting laws that limit or 
punish speech.6  Perhaps because of 
its prominence as the first of all 
enumerated rights7 or because of its 
simple but magnanimous message,8 
the First Amendment has captured 
the hearts and minds of its citizens:9 it is romanticized by the 
avant-garde as a protector of art and intellectual freedom,10 it 
reverberates throughout suburban lunchrooms as irreverent re-
buttals to schoolhouse teasing,11 and it is proclaimed a tool for 
political and social change by the downtrodden and oppressed.12  
There is no doubt that its tenets, secured by our country’s foun-
ders, have allowed American culture to breathe unorthodox air,13 
a communicative freedom that is often stifled by less expansive 
speech protections in other countries.14  Lurking in the shadows, 
however, is speech’s power to harm.15  Speech, capable of much 
more than mere offense, can cause psychological16 and physi-
cal17 harm to its intended targets, as well as message recipients.18  
 There has been much debate over the legitimacy and 
propriety of regulating racist speech.19  This debate has typically 
focused on racist speech made in a public setting that causes 
harm to the target of the hate speech.  Efforts to regulate such 
speech have largely failed20 because of the doctrinal prohibition 
on regulating speech based on the ideology of its message.21  
 This article argues that the unique nature of parent-to-
child racist speech allows it to be regulated under the present 
First Amendment framework, notwithstanding the failed at-
tempts to regulate other racist speech.  The article further argues 
that such speech should be regulated because the core principles 
that underlie speech protection are not applicable to parent-to-
child racist speech.  By focusing on the child as the hearer of 
hate speech, First Amendment roadblocks that typical hate 
speech regulations run into may be bypassed.  After showing that 
First Amendment principles such as “marketplace” theory and 
autonomy theory are unpersuasive when applied to a child, this 
article will show that the captive audience doctrine allows the 
State to regulate a parent’s decision to raise her child as a racist.   
Parent-to-child racist speech also implicates the consti-
tutional right of a parent to raise her child as she sees fit.  Al-
though a parent has the right to control the upbringing of her 
child, she does not have a right to raise her child as a racist.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized a parent’s fundamental right 
to control the upbringing of her child as a liberty interest pro-
tected under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  The Fourteenth Amendment, in 
turn, requires that courts show deference 
to a parent’s decisions.22  Underlying this 
right is the presumption that most parents 
act in the best interest of their children.  In 
reality, however, a parent’s decision is not 
always in the best interest of her child.23  
To accommodate this reality, a parent’s 
fundamental right is limited by the rights 
of the child and the State’s interests in 
protecting children from harm and promot-
ing societal well-being.24  
 When a child’s “physical or men-
tal health is jeopardized,” the State has the 
power to abrogate the parent’s rights if it 
is in the best interest of the child.25  Teach-
ing racism to a child jeopardizes a child’s mental and physical 
health.26  Once the harm to a child is established, the State can 
potentially limit a parent’s fundamental right.  In sum, parent-to-
child racist speech can be regulated without violating either a 
parent’s right to free speech or a parent’s right to control the 
upbringing of her child.  
 Part I begins with a discussion of the legal proceedings 
through which the State has the opportunity to regulate parent-
to-child racist speech.  It then discusses how the transmission of 
racist speech from parent to child harms the child.  Part II ad-
dresses the substantive due process analysis.  This Part discusses 
the scope of the parental rearing right, and it shows that the 
State’s interest in protecting the welfare of the child and promot-
ing societal well-being may allow the State to interfere when a 
racist upbringing exists.  Part III begins with an examination of a 
child’s speech rights.  It moves into an explanation of the under-
lying justifications for free speech and argues that they are inap-
posite to parent-to-child racist speech.  Finally, it introduces the 
captive audience exception and shows that parent-to-child racist 
speech is not protected because a child is essentially “captive” to 
her parent’s racist speech.  Part IV concludes with a discussion 
of the obstacles and implications of regulating parent-to-child 
racist speech. 
parent-to-child racist speech can be 
regulated without violating either a 
parent’s right to free speech or a par-
ent’s right to control the upbringing 
of her child.  




CHILDREN AND RACISM IN THE REAL WORLD 
   
 At a county fair, a young girl sings sweetly in front of a 
small crowd: 
 
Well sit down and listen, to what I have to say.  
Soon will come a great war, a bloody but holy 
day.  And after that purging our people will be 
free, and sing up in the bright skies, a sun for 
all to see. 
 
Times are very tough now for a proud White 
man to live.  And although it may appear that 
this world has no life to give.  Times are soon 
changing, this can[’]t go on [f]or long.  And 
on that joyful summer’s day, we’ll sing our 
Victory song.27  
 
In another part of the country, a young boy comes 
home after school and becomes a virtual Klansman, killing 
Blacks, Latinos, and Jews in an “ethnic cleansing” video game. 
28  Somewhere else, a child creates a kid’s page for his father’s 
hate group’s web site.29  A six-year-old African-American boy 
riding on a school bus sees a group of white men and women 
through the window and proclaims, “I hate white people.”30  
Somewhere else, a group of middle-school children paints swas-
tikas on cars in a predominantly Jewish neighborhood.31  A 
group of high-school students is on trial for brutally beating a 
young girl because of her race.32  
 The aforementioned acts, based on real events, invoke a 
response of sadness for the child, rather than revulsion.  This 
response to children exhibiting racist tendencies stems from a 
sense that the racist child has been robbed of the innocence of 
childhood, and that the adult that she becomes will have been 
robbed of opportunities as she matures down a path already 
paved for her.  Although there are many factors that cause a 
child to hate another based on race, 33 this article addresses only 
parental influence.34  This article sets out to determine whether 
the State may prevent harm to a child and to society from par-
ents who pass racist hatred down to their children.  This section 
begins with a description of the legal arenas in which the State 
may wield its power to restrict racist parental indoctrination.  
 
SOCIAL CONTEXT: INHERITING RACISM 
  
Parents pass down many things to their children: genes, person-
ality traits,35 values, oral histories.36  Some parents pass down 
racism to their children through racist speech.37 
 For the purposes of this article, racist speech is hate 
speech that targets groups or individuals based on race.  There 
are several defining characteristics of hate speech.38  First, hate 
speech sends a message of hatred or contempt. Second, hate 
speech usually conveys a message of inferiority.  Third, its mes-
sage targets a specific group or an individual because she is a 
member of that group.  Racist speech includes racial threats, 
slurs, epithets, symbols, depictions, and “sanitized racist com-
ments.”39  
 The effect on a child of growing up in a racist home has 
not generated much scholarly work and a need exists for a larger 
body of social science and legal research on this topic.  How-
ever, some observations can be gleaned from the field of devel-
opmental psychology and research on racism in general.  Avail-
able research indicates that “[a]ttitudes of prejudice begin to 
form between the ages of 3 and 4 years, with immediate family 
members having the most profound effect on the development of 
attitude and values.”40  Moreover, younger children have a de-
creased cognitive ability to discern reasonable from unreason-
able information, making them more susceptible to racist 
speech.41  Thus, racism should have a more profound effect on 
children, especially younger ones, than on adults.  It is with an 
eye sensitive toward this impressionability of young children to 
racist speech that we turn to discuss racism’s effect on the racist 
speaker. 
 Hate is a defining characteristic of racist speech.  Hate 
is a “complex, affective state alloyed with aggression.  It is 
aroused by the experience of frustration and, in its most stark 
and uncompromising manner, by events that are felt to threaten 
life.”42  Within the psychiatric community, there has been debate 
over whether extreme racism is a serious mental illness. Some 
psychiatrists propose its inclusion in the Diagnostic and Statisti-
cal Manual of Mental Disorders.43 
 Those who argue that racism is a mental illness explain 
that “[extremely racist] patients experience problems of impulse 
disturbance.  This disinhibition may activate inculcated, socially 
learned, biased beliefs; adverse cognitive appraisals and stereo-
types; hostile behaviors toward out-group persons; or some com-
bination of these things.”44  Children, who have lower impulse 
control relative to adults, are therefore more prone to act upon 
racist beliefs.  Researchers have also discovered psychological 
and physiological problems associated with clinical racism: “[f]
requent clinical problems include lability, hypo-mania, and 
marked anxiety.  Additionally, these patients evidence relational 
deficits.  Psychotherapy patients who expressed biased attitudes 
toward members of cultural out-groups . . . also had higher rat-
ings for . . . paranoid, borderline, and antisocial personality dis-
orders, when compared with other psychotherapy patients.”45 
 While there is no conclusive evidence that learning 
racism causes psychological or physiological harm to the racist, 
the law does not always require conclusive evidence in order to 
protect children from likely harm.46  Moreover, racial bias has a 
severe impact on the social competence of the racist:  
 
For patients who evidence severe forms of bias, inter-
group contact is predictably aversive.  For these pa-
tients, out-group persons are often seen as threatening.  
For some clinically biased patients, the solution is 
avoidance.  Other patients experience marked anxiety, 
and yet others express overt hostility. . . Pathologically 
biased patients may engage in overtly hostile behaviors 
in benign intergroup situations.47 
 
 An inability to engage in culturally diverse interactions 
is also a practical disability.  It prohibits the child and future 
adult from fully participating in society, inhibiting even the most 
basic activities, such as going to the grocery store, workplace, or 
voting booths.   
 Parents who instill racist beliefs in their children con-
tribute to their children’s feelings of threat, anxiety, and fear.  
For example, most members of the American white racist move-
ment believe that “they, as White men, are members of an en-
dangered species.”48  Racist parents strip their child of any sense 
of personal security.49  The fear instilled by racist parents goes 
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beyond teaching a child to be cautious about talking to strangers 
or crossing the street.  Whereas there is a rational basis to fear 
crossing the street, the fear of people of another race is irra-
tional.50  Further, racism not only instills fear, but also creates 
contempt and hatred.  It is the combination of both fear and ha-
tred that harms the child. 
 Some members of the psychiatric community have ar-
gued that teaching racism to a child is a form of psychological 
abuse, which constitutes child abuse in some States.51  Psycho-
logical abuse is “sustained inappropriate behaviour which dam-
ages, or substantially reduces, the creative and developmental 
potential of crucially important mental faculties and mental 
processes of a child . . . [including] intelligence, memory, recog-
nition, perception, attention, language and moral develop-
ment.”52  
 One reason offered to show that racist indoctrination is 
psychological abuse is that it adversely affects a child’s moral 
development.  For example, “children taught to hate are pre-
vented from incorporating the desirable virtues of tolerance, 
reverence for life, respect for individual differences and mutual 
understanding,” causing these children to “suffer an arrest in 
their moral development.”53  Recent neurobiology studies have 
also linked early childhood psychological abuse to abnormalities 
in brain development.54  Thus, parent-child hate indoctrination 
may have an irreversible effect on a child’s developing brain. 
 A related concern is that children who are taught to 
hate will later commit hate crimes.  While no definitive link has 
been shown between racist indoctrination during childhood and 
hate crimes, it is estimated that 70% of all hate crimes are com-
mitted by juveniles.55  One possible reason for this statistic is 
that young people are more likely to act on racist beliefs than 
adults.56 
 The power of the State to interfere with a parent’s deci-
sion to raise her child as a racist person rests on the availability 
of legal forums in which the State can exercise its power, the 
type and degree of the parent’s racist behavior, and the extent of 
harm the behavior has on the child.  The next section discusses 
the jurisprudence that has developed around the State’s ability to 




 The State plays several substantial roles in protecting 
and supporting children.57  Under the child protection umbrella, 
the State provides services ranging from family counseling to 
parenting education,58 and it governs the removal and termina-
tion of parental rights.59  Under the family dissolution umbrella, 
the State may determine custody of a child, limit visitation 
rights, and order a parent to behave in a specific way to retain 
custody of a child.  Through public assistance, the State aids a 
parent in supporting her child.  In addition, the State influences a 
child’s upbringing by providing public education and mandating 
medical care.60  Each of the aforementioned roles potentially 
provides the State with the opportunity to interfere with a par-
ent’s decision to teach racism to her child.61  However, as State 
intervention is often tied to family failure or dysfunction,62  par-
ents of intact families may be granted more freedom to teach 
racism to their children, and children of intact families may not 
be appropriately protected from racist indoctrination. 
 Today, some courts consider a parent’s use of racist 
speech as a factor in determining custody and visitation rights.63  
In In re Bianca W.F.,64 the Superior Court of Connecticut found 
that “the father’s use of racial slurs or derogatory racial refer-
ences” in front of the children constituted a “continuing form of 
neglect of the children’s educational and moral needs.”65  Courts 
have also ordered parents not to use specific racist language in 
front of their children.66  While this practice has largely escaped 
the notice of all but a few First Amendment scholars,67 this arti-
cle argues that prohibiting or restricting a parent from teaching 
her child to hate is constitutionally permissible.  The contrary 
view is that the consideration of speech in such proceedings is 
impermissible because it violates free speech and substantive 
due process.68  The debate survives partly because of the little 
attention paid to family law proceedings.69  
 Today, amidst war, increasing intolerance of immigra-
tion, and rising hate crime statistics, racist indoctrination of chil-
dren by parents must be examined.  The State can and should 
use its power to protect children from such indoctrination. 
  
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS:  
BALANCING RIGHTS 
 
 Three interests are implicated when the State interferes 
with a parenting decision: (1) the parents’, (2) the State’s, and 
(3) the child’s.70  A court will weigh these interests to determine 
whether a State statute or action infringes on a parent’s constitu-
tional right.    
 The ability of the State to interfere with a parent’s right 
to teach her child racism depends, first, on the relative impor-
tance assigned to the parent’s right to control the upbringing of 
her child.  The United States Supreme Court has found that a 
parent’s right to raise her child is a fundamental right.71  This 
fundamental right of the parent to raise her child as she sees fit 
rests on a presumption that parents act in the best interests of 
their children.72  The parental right in part derives from the 
child’s interest in being taken care of properly; however, real 
world experience calls into question the validity of the presump-
tion that parents always act in their children’s best interest. 
 The Court has also recognized that the State has the 
authority to intervene when a child’s welfare is at stake.  The 
State has greater power over children than it has over adults be-
cause “[a] democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity 
as citizens, with all that implies.”73  The State may interfere with 
the parent-child relationship where necessary to protect the wel-
fare of the child or to educate future citizens.74 
 The State’s ability to impose itself into the parent-child 
relationship derives not only from its own interest in protecting 
its citizens, but also from the unique constitutional status of the 
child.  A child has constitutional rights, but not to the extent that 
adults do.75  The limitations on a child’s rights are explained by 
the unique characteristics of childhood.  For example, the child’s 
underdeveloped cognitive processes limit a child’s ability to 
make appropriate decisions about her life.  Young children “are 
not able to think abstractly, have a limited future time sense, and 
are limited in their ability to generalize and predict from experi-
ence.”76  For this reason, the law restricts a minor’s choice to 
marry,77 engage in sexual activity with adults,78 consume alco-
hol, and vote in elections.  
 It is often unclear how a parent’s right to control the 
upbringing of her child ought to be balanced against the State’s 
interest in protecting the well-being of the child and the child’s 
individual rights.  The Supreme Court has failed to define the 
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scope of the parental right to control the upbringing of chil-
dren.79  States have largely filled in this gap on a case-by-case 
basis.80  Legal scholars and social scientists have also weighed 
in. One view is that a parent should not have a fundamental right 
to control the upbringing of her child at all.81  A more common 
view—that a parent should have some rights—stops short of 
relegating the child to parental property.82  Under this view, a 
parent should make decisions about her child with limited State 
interference for several reasons: (1) a child cannot support her-
self or make important decisions; (2) optimal child rearing in-
cludes intimate and continuous relationships; (3) parents are in 
the best position to know what is best for the child, and they care 
more about their child than anyone else; and (4) parents have 
traditionally held these rights.83  Additionally, some commenta-
tors justify parental rights by noting 
that parents have a personal interest 
in molding their children in accor-
dance with their desires and ideals.84  
The issue of parent-child racist 
speech falls into the gray area of 
parent-child-state jurisprudence.   
 
SCOPE OF PARENTS’ FUNDAMEN-
TAL RIGHT 
 
 Two of the earliest cases to 
recognize the right to parent were 
Meyer v. Nebraska85 and Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters.86  Both cases in-
volved parents’ right to educate 
their children as they see fit.  Meyer addressed a Nebraska stat-
ute that prohibited the teaching of foreign languages, with the 
exception of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, to school children below 
the eighth grade.87  The purpose of the statute was to “promote 
civic development” by ensuring that children “learn English and 
acquire American ideals” before they are educated in foreign 
languages and ideals.88  The plaintiff, a parochial school teacher, 
was convicted under the statute for teaching a ten-year-old stu-
dent to read German.89  The Court struck down the statute as 
unconstitutional for unreasonably interfering with three inter-
ests: the “calling of modern language teachers,” the 
“opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge,” and the “power 
of parents to control the education” of their children.90  The 
Court was also concerned that the statute would disadvantage 
the foreign-born segment of the population91 absent proof that 
learning foreign languages harmed the health or well-being of a 
child.92  In Meyer, the Court noted that teaching a child German 
was not in fact harmful and that there was some evidence that it 
was actually helpful to a child.93  
 Pierce v. Society of Sisters also recognized a parent’s 
right to control the upbringing of her child.94  In Pierce, the 
Court struck down an Oregon statute that required all parents 
and guardians of children between the ages of eight and sixteen 
to send their children to public school.95  Two private schools 
challenged the statute on the basis that compulsory public school 
attendance threatened business.96  The Court rested its decision 
on the statute’s impermissible interference with the plaintiff’s 
property rights.97  In reaching its decision, however, the Court 
found the statute was not a proper exercise of State power be-
cause it unreasonably and arbitrarily interfered “with the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education 
of children under their control.”98  The Court reasoned that the 
underlying purpose of the parental right is “to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.”99  According to the 
Court, “[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State.”100  The 
State thus has a limited role in raising a child. 
 Meyer and Pierce both suggest that the parent’s interest 
in controlling the upbringing of her child can outweigh the 
State’s interest.  Later cases reinforced the fundamental right of 
a parent to control the upbringing of her child.101  In 2000, in 
Troxel v. Granville, the Court struck down a Washington statute 
that allowed a judge to override a parent’s decision not to allow 
third-party visitation with her child.102  The plurality reaffirmed 
the presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best inter-
est.103  The Court recognized the parental interest in the care, 
custody, and control of their children as “perhaps the oldest of 
the fundamental liberty interests recog-
nized by the Court.”104  The broad nature 
of the statute105 and the failure to accord 
deference to the parent’s choice made 
this statute unconstitutional.106  
So long as a parent adequately cares for 
his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will 
normally be no reason for the State to 
inject itself into the private realm of the 
family to further question the ability of 
the parent to make the best decisions 
concerning the rearing of that parent’s 
children.107 
  
LIMITS ON PARENTS’ RIGHT 
 
 The parental right is not without limits.  The State’s 
power to limit a parent’s child rearing discretion is at its highest 
when the child’s physical or mental health is jeopardized.108  
The State, however, has the power to interfere even if the par-
ent’s decision does not severely jeopardize the child’s health.  
An early case to recognize the limits on parental rights was 
Prince v. Massachusetts.109  In Prince, the Court held that the 
State’s power to ensure that “children be both safeguarded from 
abuses and given opportunities for growth into free and inde-
pendent well-developed men and citizens” outweighed the par-
ent’s interest.110  The statute in Prince imposed criminal sanc-
tions on guardians who permitted their minor children to sell 
newspapers or other literature on the street.111  The plaintiff, a 
Jehovah’s Witness, was charged with violating the statute when 
she and her niece were distributing religious pamphlets for a 
suggested donation of five cents.112  The Court concluded that 
while the “custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents,” the State can override the parent’s right in order to 
guard the child’s well-being,113 which may include “matters of 
conscience and religious conviction.”114  State power over mat-
ters of conscience strengthens its ability to regulate parent-child 
hate indoctrination, which is largely a matter of conscience.   
 Thus, the limit on a parent’s fundamental right and the 
State’s powerful interest in protecting the well-being of its chil-
dren leaves room for the State to intervene when a parent’s racist 
speech harms the child’s mental health, public safety, or peace 
and order.  Even so, before the State may intervene it must over-
come a separate constitutional concern: the parent’s and the 
child’s right to free speech.  This constitutional concern is the 
focus of the following section. 
 
 
the limit on a parent’s fundamental 
right and the State’s powerful interest 
in protecting the well-being of its 
children leaves room for the State to 
intervene when a parent’s racist 
speech harms the child’s mental 
health, public safety,  
or peace and order.   
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III.FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
 
 Under the First Amendment, regulating parent-to-child 
racist speech implicates both the parent’s right to speech and the 
child’s right to access speech.   
 
 
CHILDREN AND FIRST AMENDMENT COMMENTARY 
 
The cognitive, moral, and emotional immaturity of  
children can render them especially vulnerable to some forms of 
expression that they are ill equipped to protect themselves from. 
They depend on others to advance their crucial interests and 
protect them from harm.115 
 
 Over the course of a lifetime, welfare interests wane 
and liberty interests wax.  When a person is born, she cannot 
care for herself and therefore has the greatest interest in being 
cared for.  As she matures, she becomes better able to take care 
of herself, so her welfare interest decreases.  Liberty interests, or 
interests in being free, increase as a child grows into an autono-
mous being.  Paternalism is thus less offensive to a child than to 
an adult.116  
 The scope of the child’s right to free speech depends on 
a balancing of welfare or developmental interests and liberty 
interests.117  Developmental interests are comprised of two types 
of interests: those interests that affect the present well-being of 
the child and those interests that are held in trust.118  Describing 
the present developmental interests of a child, one commentator 
suggests: 
 
[B]ecause we must show concern for the quality of the 
experience of childhood, we have reason to insulate 
children from unsettling materials even if exposure 
does not result in significant harm . . . We do not aug-
ment the quality of children’s lives by exposing them to 
materials that they cannot grasp, but which nonetheless 
elicit strong unsettling responses 
from them.119  
 
The developmental interests of a child are 
harmed by racist indoctrination.120  If a 
child manifests the psychological and 
physical effects of clinical racism,121 her 
quality of life during childhood is low.  
 Future-oriented interests are 
those that “equip children with the habits 
and capacities for reflective deliberation and self-direction that 
will permit them to live successful and responsible adult 
lives.”122  If an activity harms a child’s ability to develop a sense 
of justice or hinders growth of deliberative faculties, then the 
child’s developmental interests are harmed.123  It is in this sense 
that it can be said that hate speech indoctrination has a 
“silencing effect” on the child.  “If children are to become the 
sort of beings for whom full rights of free expression are valu-
able, then the moral capacities on which the value of these rights 
depends must be suitably nurtured and developed.”124  Indoctri-
nating a child with racist hate or fear of race extinction silences 
future speech, thus degrading the interest that the First Amend-
ment was meant to protect.  While most of the scholarship dis-
cussing First Amendment rights during childhood primarily ad-
dresses children’s access to obscenity and violence, much of the 
argument is applicable to hate speech.  There is a presumption in 
much of the scholarship that the State and parents agree that 
children should not be subject to obscenity and violence, or that 
the State can regulate only in situations where the parent invites 
such intervention.   
Kevin Saunders discusses the effect on a child of learn-
ing hate speech,125 arguing that “a racist child is of questionable 
psychological health, and the existence of hate-based crime 
demonstrates the danger of racism to community safety, so at-
tempts to teach racism to children harm both the psychological 
health of children and the physical safety of society.”126  Saun-
ders focuses on the constitutionality of prohibiting third parties 
from teaching racism to a child.  In developing his thesis, how-
ever, he states without analysis that the State would have no 
right to interfere if the parent wanted the child to receive hate 
material from a third party.127  This article rejects that argument 
because it fails to consider the State’s two distinct interests in 
protecting a child: a parens patriae interest and an interest in 
aiding the parent.  Saunders thus overlooks the ability of the 
State, as parens patriae, to protect the child from receiving rac-
ist information even when the parent wants the child to receive 
the information. 
 The Supreme Court recognized the two interests of the 
State in Ginsberg v. New York, in which the Court upheld the 
conviction of a luncheonette owner for selling sexually explicit 
magazines to a minor, in violation of New York law.128  The 
Court identified two legitimate interests that granted the State 
the power to restrict children’s access to speech.  The first inter-
est is the State’s “independent interest” in fulfilling its parens 
patriae function—in protecting the well-being of its youth and 
in seeing “that they are safeguarded from abuses which might 
prevent their growth into free and independent well-developed 
men and citizens.”129  The second interest is the State’s function 
in aiding parents in their role of parent.130  The first interest is 
most salient in determining the State’s power to interfere with 
parental discretion.  
 Restricting a parent’s ability to transmit racism to their 
children serves the State’s parens 
patriae interest when the child’s 
well-being is harmed and her abil-
ity to grow into an independent, 
well-developed citizen is hindered 
by the parent’s racist ideas.  For 
example, the parens patriae inter-
est is served by protecting a young 
child from being taught songs that 
call for a racial holy war and pro-
claim the inferiority of other races.  The developmental effects 
of racism on a child, which support this assertion, are discussed 
in Part I. 
 Modern cases that restrict a child’s access to harmful 
information must deal with the effect that any restriction may 
have on adult access to information.131  FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation recognized that children can be protected from offensive 
speech by restricting broadcasting of offensive speech to hours 
when children will not likely be listening.132  Unlike restricting a 
radio broadcast to certain hours, which may potentially affect a 
large number of willing adult radio listeners, restricting a parent 
from teaching racism to her children will have only a nominal 
effect on third-party adults.  Any restrictions would affect only a 
parent’s speech to her own child.  It is likely that no one but the 
parent and child will be affected by the restriction.  
Indoctrinating a child with racist 
hate or fear of race extinction si-
lences future speech, thus degrading 
the interest that the First Amendment 
was meant to protect.   
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NO MARKET PLACE FOR CHILDREN 
 
 An abundance of scholarship has been dedicated to 
explaining why speech must be protected from government 
regulation.  The first justification is that free speech unearths the 
truth.133  Justice Holmes argued that free speech is essential to 
finding truth and that only through a clash of ideas can truth be 
attained.134  According to Holmes, “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.”135  John Stuart Mill, British philosopher and politi-
cal economist, provided a similar justification for protecting 
speech:  
 
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing expression of an opin-
ion is, that it is robbing the human race; posterity as 
well as the existing generation; those who dissent from 
the opinion, still more than those who hold it.  If the 
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is 
almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and 
livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision 
with error.136  
 
Suppressing speech would have the unin-
tended ramification of driving speech underground and 
effectively allowing bad ideas to “smolder,” rather than 
being ousted through opposition.137  Consistent with the 
marketplace of ideas is the argument that offensive 
speech should be combated with more speech rather 
than with censorship.138  
 
 The marketplace of ideas argument has been criticized 
on several grounds.139  First, proponents of the market-failure 
model argue that there are inequities in the speech market, such 
as lack of media access, that create a need for market interven-
tion.140  Second, critics argue that absolute protection of speech 
is unjustifiable even though “truth” may eventually prevail be-
cause the harm caused in the short term is too great.141  
 In the context of speaking to a child, the marketplace of 
ideas is untenable.  First, children “lack the experiential basis of 
adults and are more likely to be led astray.”142  They often lack 
the capacity to distinguish poorly reasoned ideas from well-
reasoned ideas.143  The marketplace theory presupposes that the 
“buyers” of ideas will have the capacity to reason.  Thus, where 
the “buyers” in a market are children, the truth is less likely to 
surface, if at all.  Our society acknowledges that a child has no 
real bargaining power and cannot be counted on to make serious 
decisions responsibly.  This is exemplified by the fact that chil-
dren are shielded from other free markets as well (e.g., children 
may not work, buy cigarettes or alcohol, or obtain a credit card).   
 Second, with respect to children, the marketplace of 
ideas is not competitive.  Parents are the major source of ideas 
for young children, especially those who are home-schooled or 
isolated.  If prejudices begin to form around three or four years 
of age, being exposed to different ideas in school after age three 
or four will not successfully correct the bias.144  Just as there is 
skewed access to media for adults,145 parents occupy a dispro-
portionate market share when it comes to their children. 
 The second justification for free speech is that it acts as 
a check on abuse of governmental authority by enabling people 
to speak out against the government and reveal truths about 
those who have political power.146  One view is that this justifi-
cation survives when applied to parent-to-child speech: 
“Government power to coercively restrict parental speech, on 
top of its power to engage in its own speech in public schools, 
would tend to cement existing orthodoxies and suppress poten-
tially valuable but unpopular ideas.”147  This argument misses 
the point that whatever value the expression of potentially valu-
able but unpopular ideas may have, this value is lost on children 
who are unable to comprehend the information.  When a child 
reaches maturity, a parent’s racist speech will be less harmful to 
the child, and thus such “unpopular ideas” will not be absolutely 
prohibited.  
 The third justification for free speech is that a democ-
racy relies on the ability of its members to debate political issues 
and make informed choices.  Free expression must be the center-
piece of self-government.  The self-governance argument148 sug-
gests that “[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the voters 
acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous de-
votion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is 
assumed to express.”149  When we are speaking of those who do 
not participate in the political process, however, this argument is 
not persuasive.  Because children are not allowed to vote, the 
political process is not weakened by restricting adults from ex-
pressing political ideas to children.  This is especially true for 
very young children who do not possess the cognitive ability 
even to understand political ideas.  Of course, children become 
future voters, so there is an interest in preparing them for their 
political role by exposing them to diverse beliefs when they are 
capable of understanding them.  However, these goals are fur-
thered by preserving the autonomy of future generations of vot-
ers, not by indoctrinating with racist hate.  Where a child has 
been taught to hate, she will not be in a position to make in-
formed choices, for her ability to make choices based on reason, 
rather than on preprogrammed fear and contempt, will have been 
impaired.   
 A non-instrumental justification for protecting speech 
is that it respects individual autonomy and nurtures certain be-
neficent character traits.150  According to this view, the practice 
of tolerating offensive speech rather than punishing it serves the 
individual and society by providing a forum for people to exer-
cise their “capacity for tolerance,” which translates generally 
into a disposition of restraint and self-denial.151  For example, 
“[s]imply coexisting and overcoming the wish to establish an 
overly homogenized society are important goals,” and “free 
speech may simply function as a zone of extreme tolerance, not 
because the behavior tolerated is important to human self-
realization or to truth, but because as a practical matter living 
with divergent behavior is necessary.”152  It is inapposite, how-
ever, to argue that teaching children to hate based on race cre-
ates a general atmosphere of tolerance on the playground.  An 
adult racist arguably has chosen to be racist.  Thus, it makes 
sense to suggest that forcing one to hear another’s racist beliefs 
may create a more tolerant society.  Unlike racist speech among 
adults, allowing children to be indoctrinated for the sake of nur-
turing a tolerant society sacrifices the well-being of the child for 
the mere possibility that a tolerant society will emerge.  This 
sacrifice is too costly.  
 One argument against the absolute protection of hate 
speech that is relevant to parent-to-child hate speech focuses on 
the expressive function of the law.  In the hate speech context, 
the proponents of this view argue that by protecting hate speech, 
the law endorses of hate speech.  This argument is even more 
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persuasive when applied to parent-to-child hate speech.  A child, 
with a developing identity and a developing sense of self, may 
look to the law as guidance on what society approves.  By per-
mitting a parent to teach racist hate to a child, the law implies 
societal approval and even suggests encouragement of prejudi-
cial ideas.153 
 
CONTOURS OF FREE SPEECH DOCTRINE 
 
 The most basic and inaccurate interpretation of the First 
Amendment is that it is absolute, that it protects all speech.154  
Until 1931, the First Amendment applied only to Congress.155  
Thus, free speech protections were once much more limited than 
most people have come to expect.156  The key to assessing and 
predicting the constitutionality of certain speech regulations lies 
in navigating the turbulent waters of free speech rules and ex-
ceptions.  One of the most important rules in First Amendment 
jurisprudence is that speech restrictions must be both content 
and viewpoint neutral:  
 
[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that gov-
ernment has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content . . 
. [T]here is an ‘equality of status in the field of ideas,’ 
and government must afford all points of view an . . . 
opportunity to be heard.157  
The regulation of parent-to-child racist speech 
violates the content-neutral requirement. One could 
argue that the restriction derives from the harm it 
causes to children and not its message, but that argu-
ment masks the true motivation.158  Even if the regula-
tion is content-based, the captive audience doctrine 
may allow the speech to be regulated. 
 
 The Supreme Court has identified a hierarchy of pro-
tected speech based on the value of the speech.159  The speech 
with the highest value is political speech because there is 
“practically universal agreement that a major purpose of the 
First Amendment was to protect the free discussion of govern-
mental affairs.”160  Political speech “includes discussion of can-
didates, structures and forms of government, the manner in 
which government is operated or should be operated, and all 
such matters relating to the political process.”161  Restrictions on 
this category receive strict scrutiny, the most stringent protection 
under the First Amendment.  Speech with lower value, such as 
obscenity162 and commercial speech,163 is easier for the govern-
ment to regulate.   
 Thus, a relevant question is whether parent-to-child 
racist speech is high-value or low-value speech.  Some racist 
speech carries a political message and therefore should be con-
sidered high-value speech, although perhaps not as valuable as 
speech directly concerning a political campaign.  On the other 
hand, some parent-to-child racist speech (e.g., speech regarding 
the social characteristics of a race and degrading speech) may 
not be political speech and should receive lesser status.  How-
ever, a viable argument may be made that no speech to a child is 
political speech because a child cannot comprehend such politi-
cal ideas.  Even if parent-to-child racist speech is considered to 
be of lower value, the Supreme Court has held that content-
based regulations of unprotected speech must still meet strict 
scrutiny.164  In sum, parent-to-child racist speech regulations that 
restrict political speech based on content place an extremely 
high burden on the government to overcome.  That burden may 
be overcome by the captive audience doctrine. 
 
FREEDOM FROM BEING CAPTIVE TO RACIST SPEECH165 
 
[A]child—like someone in a captive audience—is not possessed 
of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presuppo-
sition of First Amendment  
guarantees.166  
 
 Under the captive audience doctrine, speech is ex-
empted from First Amendment protection if it is delivered to a 
captive listener.167  The exception potentially allows the Court to 
sidestep the content-neutrality requirement of the First Amend-
ment and to curtail political expression.168 
 A captive audience, in the First Amendment sense, de-
scribes listeners who, under certain circumstances, cannot es-
cape offensive language.169  The degree and type of captivity 
necessary to invoke this doctrine is often a central point of con-
tention and confusion.170  Critics first point to the ambiguity of 
the word “captive,” arguing that “[w]e are always captive in 
some senses, and never captive in others . . . [W]e are virtually 
never captive, because there is almost always something we can 
do to avoid exposure to whatever we find most offensive.”171  
The more central problem in employing this doctrine, 
however, is that the Court has been unclear in its application of 
the doctrine.172  It is difficult to find guiding language in case 
law or a common thread among cases that apply the captive au-
dience doctrine.173  For example, the Court has found people 
entering health facilities captive to anti-abortion protests.174  It 
has also found a person riding in a car or at home listening to the 
radio captive to an offensive radio broadcast;175 a homeowner 
captive to focused residential picketing;176 a homeowner captive 
to sexually oriented mailings that she has requested not to re-
ceive;177 and a public bus rider captive to political campaign 
advertising on the bus.178  It is difficult to discern an identifiable 
pattern from which a person can determine whether the captive 
audience doctrine should apply in a specific case. 
 Several concepts have been offered to make sense of 
First Amendment captivity.179  The first basic concept is that the 
captive audience doctrine is founded upon preserving “the right 
to be let alone” or “the right to privacy.”180  Two principles un-
derlie this right: an autonomy interest and a right to repose.181  
The second concept is that the State has an interest in protecting 
the privacy rights of an unwilling listener. 
The autonomy principle is common to both the right to 
free speech and the right to privacy.  Being free to speak one’s 
mind nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.182  Likewise, 
being able to choose the ideas and thoughts to which one is ex-
posed nurtures and preserves individual autonomy.183  Despite 
the various plausible definitions for the word “captivity,” at its 
core, captivity suggests that a captive person is one who is de-
prived of autonomy or meaningful choice.  With that definition 
in mind, the captive audience doctrine can be understood as a 
tool that balances power between the captor and the captive in 
order to restore individual autonomy.184  
These underlying principles reveal that the goals of the 
First Amendment and the right to privacy are not in conflict: by 
placing a premium on autonomy, both require protection of the 
child from racist indoctrination.  Because the young mind is so 
easily, and often irreversibly, shaped, parent-to-child racist 
speech disturbs the autonomy of the future adult.  The State has 
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an interest in protecting the autonomy rights of the future adult 
disturbed by such speech. 
 In addition to the right to make individual choices, the 
right to be let alone is concerned with the right to repose or to be 
at peace.  This right is most often violated when a person is be-
ing disturbed at home.  This is so because if she cannot retreat to 
her home, there may be nowhere to retreat at all.  Consequently, 
the home has a special status in captive audience jurispru-
dence.185  The right to repose in one’s home has a strong impli-
cation for parent-to-child racist indoctrination because such 
communication likely occurs in the home.  Thus, the child has 
nowhere to retreat from unwanted racist inculcation.  In sum, 
both the child’s autonomy interest and the child’s right to repose 
the two interests the captive audience doctrine endeavors to pro-
tect will be served if the captive audience doctrine is applied to 
the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm.  
The State also has an interest in protecting the unwill-
ing listener.  In the parent-to-child hate speech paradigm, the 
child may seem to be a willing listener.  Being willing, however, 
presupposes that the listener has a choice.  In the parent-to-child 
model, the child has no choice and is therefore presumptively 
unwilling.  A young child is truly captive to her parents.186  She 
cannot decide to be born, to be born into a particular family, or 
to be provided with a particular level of care.187  In addition, 
“[w]hatever chance [she] may have at achieving autonomy de-
pends on the emotional and material resources invested during 
[her] childhood.”188  Because a child is dependent upon her 
guardian189 for everyday necessities, a child has no choice but to 
listen.190  In that sense, a child is powerless to turn off harmful 
speech.   
 
 
CONCLUSION: WAIT UNTIL THEY’RE OLDER 
 
 Free speech and a parent’s right to control the upbring-
ing of her child are two of the most important rights granted by 
the United States Constitution.  Both rights protect and reflect 
autonomy and privacy.  They secure a profound sense of liberty, 
under which this country has flourished.  At the same time, both 
rights have limitations founded on a basic principle of collective 
well-being.  Those limitations are at its strongest when the well-
being of a child is at stake.  While a child is not a mere creature 
of the State, neither is a child a mere creature of her parents.  
The reality is that some parents do not act with the best interests 
of their child in mind.  As social science research suggests, a 
parent who raises her child as a racist does not act in the best 
interests of her child.  Therefore, a parent’s right to control the 
upbringing of her child may be limited by the State’s power to 
protect the child’s well-being.   
 The State’s power to restrict a parent from indoctrinat-
ing her child is governed by both the free speech doctrine and 
the substantive due process doctrine.  Under the best-interests-
of-the-child standard, the State may interfere with a parent’s 
right to control the upbringing of the child, though the State ac-
tion must meet strict scrutiny to prevail on constitutional 
grounds.  The precise scope of the State’s power under this stan-
dard is unclear and is largely within the court’s discretion.  Wide 
discretion in this area may be problematic because it leaves it up 
to a judge, with little guidance, to decide what is best for the 
child.   
 Under the captive audience doctrine, a state may have 
the power to limit a parent’s racist speech to her child because 
the child is captive to her parent’s speech.  The main theoretical 
obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate speech is that it inter-
feres with one of the central tenets of free speech: the content 
and viewpoint-neutrality requirement.  It is not up to the govern-
ment to prescribe orthodoxy.  Proscribing parent-to-child hate 
speech can be considered a viewpoint-neutral restriction—that 
is, no one can teach their children to hate.  Even if the neutrality 
requirement is not met, the captive audience doctrine may allow 
the State to bypass the requirement when the child is deemed 
captive to her parent’s hate speech. 
 There are also several practical obstacles that must be 
addressed if the State is to regulate parent-to-child hate speech.  
First, the State may not be in a position to know what a child is 
learning in the home.  A possible answer to this obstacle would 
be to treat parental racist indoctrination as akin to child abuse.  
Like child abuse, there are physical and verbal manifestations of 
racism.  A second related obstacle is finding a plaintiff to assert 
the child’s rights in court.  A possible solution is that, as in child 
abuse cases, the State could assert the child’s rights.  A next 
friend or a guardian ad litem can be assigned.   
 Even if a way to enforce a regulation or rule is found, 
there is the potential that the restrictions will disproportionately 
affect divorced parents, single parents, or African-American 
parents because of their overrepresentation in the legal system.  
Affording a judge broad discretion may also lead to inconsistent 
application.   
 Another obstacle to regulating parent-to-child hate 
speech is the ability to find an appropriate remedy.  Absent other 
evidence of abuse, separating a child from her parent may be too 
extreme, especially when such separation is based on inconclu-
sive science and inconsistent application of the law.  A practical 
response would instead be a judicial order not to use specific 
language in front of the child or mandatory enrollment in a toler-
ance workshop for the parent and child. 
 This article is just a small step toward the goal of pro-
tecting children from their parents’ racist indoctrination.  It sets 
forth a possible goal, though one with many well-intentioned 
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a religious conviction the mother has failed to instill in her daughter, a hope of 
caring for her daughter’s baby as her own because of an inability or unwilling-
ness to bear another child herself, a defensive or resentful attitude because she 
bore illegitimate children without seeking or being able to secure an abortion, or 
a general distaste for abortion.”  Katheryn D. Katz, The Pregnant Child’s Right 
to Self-determination, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1119, 1161-62 (1999) (quoting Nanette 
Dembitz, The Supreme Court and a Minor's Abortion Decision, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1251, 1255 (1980)). 
24 See Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“Nonetheless, we have recog-
nized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in 
dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”). 
25 See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Spiering v. Heinman, 448 F. Supp.2d 1129 
Special - Fall 2008                                                                                                                                                                                 69  
 
(2006) (holding that a State law requiring parents to get metabolic testing for 
their infant does not violate the parents’ fundamental liberty right to control the 
upbringing of their child). 
26 Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637 
(2006). 
27 This example is based on Prussian Blue, a blond-haired, blue-eyed teenage 
neo-Nazi singing duo. PRUSSIAN BLUE, Victory Day, on FRAGMENT OF THE 
FUTURE (Resistance Records 2004), available at http://www.lyrics007.com/
Prussian%20Blue%20Lyrics/Victory%20Day%20Lyrics.html. 
28 Ethnic Cleansing is a video game created by Resistance Records, in which the 
player can choose to be a skinhead or Klansman. The player runs through the 
ghetto, killing blacks and Latinos, until finally reaching the “Jewish Control 
Center.”  To win the game, the player must assassinate former Israeli Prime 
Minister, Ariel Sharon.  Anti-Defamation League, ADL Report: Growing Prolif-
eration of Racist Video Games Target Youth on the Internet (2002), available at 
http://www.adl.org/PresRele/Internet_75/4042_72.htm.  The game’s website has 
posted the following reviews, which I reproduce here without alteration:  
 
Just got my game, E.C. and wanted to say thank’s com-
rades! You have made me so fuckin happy, tear’s are 
rollin off my white face and on to my assault rifle which I 
must now clean to prevent rust! You bastard’s(lol)......I 
dont want to seem ungrateful but is there any chance of a 
patch, that can include new’s reporter’s or gook’s? – 
Nolan   
 
I got a beta test version 4.01 and it was a scream! . . . I 
made my way down some stairs and went outside, at once, 
I was being shot at by ghetto groids, I swung into action 
and blasted the nig, copius amounts of blood spewed from 
the nig and the sound of the nigs death left me in stitches! 
The sound is like a monkey being killed by asians for a 
meal of brains! I proceeded to shoot niggers and spics 
slowly cleansing the street and vacant lot. I found an 
ammo store hidden in one of the rooms. . . . I finished 
cleansing all of level one and destroyed “Big Nig”, I made 
my way to the subway and entered level 2. The place is 
full of jews, I shoot one of the foul pigs and it said “Oy 
Vey!” I continued to shoot them, they seem a lot harder to 
kill than niggers. After cleansing part of the subway I 
began searching for more life and ammo. I found some in 
a bathroom but I had to kill 6 or 7 niggers to get to it, and 
no sooner than the bathroom was cleansed, a jew was in 
my face with a machine gun! I blasted the kike and made 
my way back to the platform, I would write more but I 
need to get back to the game! – Bob. H.  
 
Resistance Records, Reviews of Ethnic Cleansing: The Game, http://
www.resistance.com/ 
ethniccleansing/reviews.htm (last visited May 16, 2007). 
29 This example is based on a well-known leader in the white supremacist move-
ment and his son, who is rumored to have managed a children’s website for his 
father’s white supremacist organization. 
30 This event is based on the author’s personal experience in Atlanta, Georgia. 
31 This event is based on the author’s personal experience in Long Island, New 
York.  
32 Nine teenagers were convicted in California for the hate-based beating of three 
women on Halloween night. Greg Risling, 9 Youths Convicted in SoCal Hallow-
een Beating Hate-crime Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS ST. & LOC. WIRE, Jan. 27, 
2007. 
33 There is a wealth of scholarship on factors influencing child development. For 
a good discussion on such influences, see Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home 
and School, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 833, 839-840 (2007) (arguing that while influ-
ences outside the family and the school contribute to the development of a child, 
they are “legally invisible”). See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing 
the Debate About Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 
2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85 (2004); Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and 
the Socialization of Children, 91 CAL. L. REV. 967 (2003) (discussing influences 
of schools and mass media on children). 
34 A parent’s influence on a young child’s mind is supported first by common 
sense and ordinary experience. Although there are arguments to the contrary, this 
common-sense theory is supported by scientific and psychological research.  See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
35 There is a general consensus that environmental influences, such as parent-
child interaction, affect the development of a child. Diane Scott-Jones, Family 
Influences on Cognitive Development and School Achievement, 11 REV. OF 
RESEARCH IN EDUCATION 259, 260 (1984). 
36 See LINDA TATE, A SOUTHERN WEAVE OF WOMEN: FICTION OF THE CONTEM-
PORARY SOUTH 280 (The University of Georgia Press) (1994) (“Many voices are 
in my mouth . . . those of my mothers and grandmothers; and finally my own. 
The matrix and the voice, the womb and the loom, become one.”).  
37 My use of “speech” refers to speech as defined by the First Amendment.  See 
discussion infra Part II.B.  Jeffrey Evans Stake proposes a “memetic” or evolu-
tionary approach to ideas, which fits nicely into the subject of parent-to-child 
racist speech.  Jeffrey Evans Stake, Are We Buyers or Hosts? A Memetic Ap-
proach to the First Amendment, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1213 (2001). Stake suggests 
that ideas, like memes, have the power to replicate. Id. at 1214. A memetic ap-
proach aims to “prevent memes [ideas] from using harm and threats of harm to 
their human vessels.” Id. In the case of parent-to-child racist speech, a parent is a 
host, intentionally or unintentionally passing harmful memes to her young child. 
Once passed, those memes draw on the resources of the child, harm her psyche, 
and continue to replicate. 
38 Demaske, supra note 12, at 290 (citing as characteristic of hate speech any 
message “directed to a historically oppressed group” or “persecutorial, hateful, 
and degrading”). 
39 Sanitized racist comments are those made by people who are educated or 
economically advantaged that are less vulgar sounding than outright racist 
speech, but have the same sting (e.g., off-hand comments that members of cer-
tain ethnic groups are welfare cheaters).  Matsuda, supra note 16. 
40 Annie Steinberg, Jane Brooks & Tariq Remtulla, Youth Hate Crimes: Identifi-
cation, Prevention, and Intervention, 160 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 979, 984 (2003). 
41 Id.  One study that focused on parents of juvenile offenders indicated that 
“children tended to identify with their parents’ beliefs, thus demonstrating some 
of the same beliefs, including tolerance of certain groups.” Id. 
42 Id. at 979. 
43 For a discussion of the bias-as-mental-illness debate within the mental health 
community, see Shankar Vedantam, Psychiatry Ponders Whether Extreme Bias 
Can Be an Illness, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, at A01. Some psychiatrists have 
cautioned against classifying extreme racism as a psychological disorder because 
it may allow perpetrators of hate crimes to claim not guilty by mental insanity at 
trial.  See, e.g., Michael J. Grinfeld, A Tale of Two Atrocities: Can Psychiatry 
Handle the Controversy?, PSYCHIATRIC TIMES, Oct. 1999, at 32. 
44 Edward Dunbar, Reconsidering the Clinical Utility of Bias as a Mental Health 
Problem, 41 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 97, 98 
(2004).  
45 Id.  
46 E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (declining to require scien-
tific proof of harm to children potentially caused by reading sexually explicit 
magazines). Because obscenity is non-protected speech, however, the standards 
for scientific evidence are lower. Parent-to-child racist speech can be interpreted 
as a higher value speech because of the political message, and therefore may 
require evidence of harm to a child. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
47 Dunbar, supra note 44, at 98 (“For patients who evidence severe forms of bias, 
intergroup contact is predictably aversive. For these patients, out-group persons 
are often seen as threatening. For some clinically biased patients, the solution is 
avoidance. Other patients experience marked anxiety, and yet others express 
overt hostility. It is not surprising that these patients are interculturally incompe-
tent. Pathologically biased patients may engage in overtly hostile behaviors in 
benign intergroup situations.”). 
48 Raphael S. Ezekiel, An Ethnographer Looks at Neo-Nazi and Klan Groups: 
The Racist Mind Revisited, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 51, 53 (2002). 
49 Id.   
50 See generally Susan Feldman, The Shadow of Difference: Sex, Race, and the 
Unconscious (Aug. 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY/Buffalo) (on 
file with Lockwood Memorial Library, SUNY/Buffalo). 
51 E.g., ALA. CODE. § 26-14-1(1) (“[Abuse] . . . can occur through nonacciden-
tal . . . mental injury.”); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.290 (“Mental injury means a 
serious injury to the child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impair-
ment in the child’s ability to function in a developmentally appropriate manner 
and the existence of that impairment is supported by the opinion of a qualified 
expert witness.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-201(2) (“'‘Abuse’ means . . . the inflic-
tion of or allowing another person to cause serious emotional damage as evi-
denced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or untoward aggressive behav-
ior, and which emotional damage is diagnosed by a medical doctor or psycholo-
gist, and is caused by the acts or omissions of an individual having care, custody 
and control of a child.”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.05 (Supp. 2008) (“[S]erious 
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ogy of Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM 50 (2000) (summarizing research performed 
on humans and animals that suggest early psychological abuse causes irreversi-
ble changes in the brain).  
55 Steinberg, Brooks & Remtulla, supra note 40, at 980. 
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with Boys Aged Eight to Sixteen, 26 INT’L J. SOC. OF L. 393 (1998) (analyzing 
racist aggression in young males as a social construct of masculinity). 
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problem-solving based approach to child welfare). 
58 See e.g., GA. DEPT. OF HUM. RESOURCES, DIVISION OF FAM. & CHILD. SER-
VICES, http://dfcs.dhr.georgia.gov (last visited May 16, 2007) (providing parent 
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in the home); N.Y. STATE, OFF. OF CHILD. & FAM. SERVICES, http://
www.ocfs.state.ny.us (last visited May 16, 2007) (providing parenting advice 
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59 Huntington, supra note 26, at 627. 
60 James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child 
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Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1353-54 (1996) (arguing that chil-
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debate on the causes of overrepresentation of African-Americans in the child-
welfare system); Naomi Cahn, Race, Poverty, History, Adoption, and Child 
Abuse: Connections, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461 (2002) (attributing the overrep-
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thus demonstrating the authority of both the State and parents over the child.  See 
Rosenbury, supra note 33. 
71 Rebecca M. Stahl, “Don’t Forget About Me”: Implementing Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
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622 (1979) (finding parental consent statute unconstitutional, but noting that a 
State can require parental consent for an unmarried minor’s abortion if the stat-
ute provides for an adequate judicial bypass).  See also Planned Parenthood v. 
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2007), GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-2, N.Y. DOM. REL. §14-2-7. 
78 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §16-6-3 (sexual intercourse with someone under the age 
of sixteen is a crime), ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-1405 (sexual intercourse with 
someone under the age of eighteen is a crime). 
79 Katz, supra note 23, at 1128-29.               
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81 James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the 
Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1372-73 (1994) [hereinafter 
Parents’ Religion]. 
82 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 1114 (1992) (arguing that 
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identity, and class aspirations”); Dwyer, Parents’ Religion, supra note 81, at 
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of their children). 
83 Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (discussing the historical signifi-
cance of the family unit and broad parental authority).  See Dwyer, Parents’ 
Religion, supra note 81, at 1424 (criticizing the reliance on tradition as a justifi-
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84 But see Christine Ryan, Revisiting the Legal Standards that Govern Requests 
to Sterilize Profoundly Incompetent Children: In Light of the “Ashley Treat-
ment,” Is a New Standard Appropriate?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 299-301 
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child). 
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her child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 396-97. 
90 Id. at 401.  
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91 “The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who speak other 
languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue.” Id. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 (1925). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 513. 
97 Id. at 536. 
98 Id. at 534. 
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corporations, and thus Fourteenth Amendment liberty guarantees were not impli-
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schools would endure under the Act. Id. at 536. Appellees asked protection 
against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons and 
the consequent destruction of their business and property. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 
535. 
100 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
101 See generally, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
102 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). The Washington law permitted 
“‘[a]ny person’ to petition for visitation rights ‘at any time’ and authorize[d] 
state superior courts to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child’s 
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their grandparents to once a month. Id. The grandparents sued for visitation 
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parents’ birthdays. Id. at 61. 
103 Id. at 67.   
104 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65. 
105 The Court held that the Washington statute unconstitutionally infringed on a 
parent’s constitutional right because the statute was “breathtakingly broad” in 
that it allowed any person to petition for visitation rights at any time and allowed 
the court to grant such visitation whenever the court deemed it in the best inter-
est of the child. Id. at 67. 
106 The statute did not instruct the court to presume that the parent’s choice was 
in the best interest of the child, and thus the State court could essentially over-
turn any decision by a fit custodial parent based solely on the judge’s determina-
tion of the child’s best interest. Id. 
107 Id. at 68-69. The burden is on the State or grandparent to disprove the pre-
sumption. Id.  
108 Parnham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“Nonetheless, we have recog-
nized that a State is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in 
dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.”). 
109 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
110 Id. at 160-61. The statute in this case prohibited children to work selling 
newspapers or other articles on the street. Id. Prince argued that the statute un-
constitutionally violated the child’s First Amendment right to practice her relig-
ion and the aunt’s Fourteenth Amendment right to control the upbringing of the 
child.  Id. at 164. 
111 Id. at 161. 
112 Id. at 162. 
113 Id. at 166. 
114 Id. at 167 (“[T]he [S]tate has a wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this in-
cludes, to some extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”).  
115 Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression For Children, 
79 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 55, 69 (2004) (integrating a liberal theory of the Consti-
tution with the promotion of children’s rights). 
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prudence, and Children’s Rights, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 279, 281 (2004) (“If 
children are treated as mini-adults, the law puts them at risk by failing to recog-
nize their distinctive needs, vulnerabilities and dependencies. On the other hand, 
if adults are treated as overgrown children, the law slips into an unwarranted 
paternalism that is at best condescending and at worst tyrannical.”). 
117 Macleod, supra note 115, at 69. 
118 Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD?: 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125 
(William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). “Rights in trust” are “rights 
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119 Macleod, supra note 115, at 72-73. 
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space?, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 287, 315 (2001) (mentioning that racist indoctrina-
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122 Macleod, supra note 115, at 71. 
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important to recognize the right of parents to provide their children with material 
that society may feel unsuitable.”  Id. at 273. “Parents must be allowed to dis-
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Id. 
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